Of Criticism and Judgment

[tcpip]

airiefairie has written an excellent post at The Isocracy Network on the perceived need of political pundits (of which I must admit adding a few elaborations and footnotes). Apart from the direct issue of personal involvement in civics, it also raises the question of the core faculties of the thinking process. By this I mean not the passive absorption of information, nor the ability to regurgitate such perceptions, but the conscious ability to criticise and judge, which should be available to any with an adult mind.

Such reflective thinking often seems missing in the minds of many adults and this causes me some concern. For without it a person simply isn't capable of expressing any rational judgment except over the own sensations, and even then not necessarily to their own good, as they are incapable of reflecting in their own tastes; I suspect such people are particularly prone to unconscious drug and alcohol abuse.

More serious pathological behaviour occurs however when moral decisions are made without criticism, and judgment, the former defined as faculty to engage in reflection and the latter to express it. With the example of Adolf Eichmann, confirmed by the famous Milgram psychology experiments and followed up by the Stanford Prison experiments, individuals who don't not engage in criticism and reflection are prone to follow what is socially expected of them - even if it means sending tens of thousands to concentration and extermination camps (Eichmann), or electrocuting people (Milgram experiments), or engaging in a physically abusive misuse of power (Stanford). Even if they claim "oh, I would never do that", the reality is most people would and do. They will follow an authoritative figure representing their church, nation, or state, or ideology to the point of engaging in the worst abuses of human rights and especially is it is socially sanctioned to do so.

Immanual Kant (whom I may not care for his metaphysics, but I often like his rationality - and no, the latter does not require the former) has two great contributions to this matter. One is the third in the philosophical trilogy, Critique of Judgment. But perhaps more important is the pithy essay 'What Is Enlightenment'. In it he quite correctly describes enlightenment as the moment when one overcomes their own mental immaturity; when they have faith in the own ability to learn through criticism and accept the criticism of others. When they no longer fear the social sanction from who become upset from 'uncomfortable comments' (which, of course, Socrates specialised in).


Now before passing my own judgment on such people, there are exceptions and caveats to be stated. Some people are simply not capable of engaging in criticism; as noted above those who have a cognitive deficiency that means they effectively do not and cannot have an adult mind. Others, capable of criticism, may have genuine fears for their physical security if they pass judgment (e.g., under a totalitarian government) - but only in such cases is a temporary silence justified. In all other cases, we should state, honestly and forthrightly, what is true and false as we perceive it (and admit our own possibility of error), to espouse what we consider right and wrong (and test these claims to universality), and even to sincerely express our tastes (acknowledging that the tastes of others will vary).


Those who do not engage in criticism are idiots; those who do not engage in judgment are cowards.

Comments

[tcpip.livejournal.com]

So he is agnostic about whether space and time might exist, and how they might exist, outside of our mode of intuition.

Even if we cannot step outside space-time (or matter-energy for that matter, or things-in-themselves) we can still engage in (critical) investigation of their existence and thus acquire (increasing and improved) knowledge of the subject at hand.

Thus I would tend towards a Newtonian position on space (contra Leibniz), and argue that there is evidence that it has an independent existence to matter, rather than being simply an abstract relationship between objects (and, likewise for time, between events) based on experimentation. Likewise I would argue that we have (via Gauss and Poincaré), again through experimentation, knowledge that space-time is effectively measured through curved, non-Euclidean geometry.

Of course, reading Kant he does have an odd definition of 'idealism'. Whereas most philosophy would argue that idealism is the position that reality is ultimately ideas and is contrasted with materialism, it seems to me that Kant argues that idealism is actually the act of criticism i.e., "The assertion that we can never be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere imagining is idealism."

Which, imo, brings me back to Strawson! Thus I find myself more comfortable with critical realism (which doesn't comment on the ultimate nature of reality vis-a-vis idealism versus materialism, but rather concentrates on the realism aspect)

Hence, not a metaphysics, but more an epistemological methodology.

That is indeed welcome, but of course Kant was writing at a time before epistemology was even coined as an inquiry.

But I should step away from this topic, as I can go on for hours in this vein.

Oh hush now. If you can go on, please do!