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tcpipMoral Univeralism, Cultural Relativism and The Sambians
The term "moral universalism" causes some disquiet among people. Many think that the term implies a set of contextual norms that are to be universally applied as a set of moral justifications. With the application of particular contextual norms in the 20th centuries - especially those related to totalitarian governments (e.g., "Race" as a justification by Nazi Germany and "Class" as a justification by Stalin's Soviet Union) or the more medieval and religious ways of thinking.
Nothing could be further from the truth. These are examples of "moral absolutism", not "universalism", and which can be further differentiated from "moral relativism". If you thinking I'm splitting hairs, please let me elaborate. Moral absolutism refers to a code that refers to specific activities which is socially binding (such as the Book of Leviticus from the Old Testament, or for that matter, most legal codes). "Moral relvatism" refers to the use of individual desire or will as justifications for moral behaviour (such as one finds in Nietzsche or Aleister Crowley's statement "Do as thou will and let that be the whole of the law") or the idea that different cultures have different moral standards each of which is deserving of equal respect.
In contrast, moral universalism refers to refers to a code of universal procedural justifications that originate from the individual and that involve other people. Moral universalism recognizes that individuals are the source of moral behaviour but also that it has a regulative orientation. One cannot, strictly speaking, be good to oneself. So the entirety of the "self-regarding" components of any act are axiomatically excluded from moral universalism. There is simply no means that one can verify the relative morality or immorality of self-regarding components, because they simply don't have any rational moral component. They are expressions of the individual senses and individual variation. It's a little bit like trying to determine whether purely objective facts have any moral component (e.g., "It is good or bad that these ants are red?").
On the other side of the coin, is the regulative orientation. Legal systems too seek regulative control over the lives of people, but they do not necessarily comply with the principles of moral universalism. There are multiple reasons for this. For starters, a legal system is also heavily influenced by notions of efficiency. Therefore it often creates laws on the basis of probabilitistic structures, rather than cause and effect or individual variation. Legal systems are also affected by political realities as well, which includes a whole range of individual and cultural prejudices and norms which apparently means for many that they have a right to tell others what they can and cannot do, regardless of whether it directly affects them or not. Thus, the legality or illegality of an action is not a sufficient moral reason in itself to engage or not to engage in an activity. The law itself (law qua law) is neither "right" nor "wrong", rather it is the content that is, to varying degrees "right" or "wrong".
As indicated previously, moral universalism works on procedural justifications. That is, an act is a moral act when an activity occurs on the basis of informed consensus regardless of the content of the act. But this is actually quite a specific mode of consensus. It requires that the actor not only affirms the request for activity (simple consent) but also has the capacity to understand what is involved (informed consent) and the requestee is not being deceptive about their reasons or intentions. To resolve this, resources can be drawn from development psychology and neurology. To summarise a great deal of literature simply, pre-adolescents and those with certain mental disabilities simply lack the intellectual maturity to engage in post-conventional moral reasoning or engage in formal cognitive operations. By late childhood they are capable of making individual assertions, but these are often confused with conventional norms (the desire to be accepted). Only with the advent of adult mental ability does an individual gain the ability to literally "think for themselves" with moral reasoning and differentiate between what is "right" and "wrong" in a meaningful way from legal and cultural norms.
Finally, there is one other component to moral universalism - and this is where it does actually get a bit slippery in practise - the notion of situational ethics. In this circumstances a moral principle may be breached if one has valid reasons to assume that that maintaining the principle will actually cause a more severe breach of morality. To use a fairly famous example from Immanuel Kant, if you seek refuge in my house and I grant you that refuge what do I say when the axe-wielding maniac comes to the door and asks for you? If I lie about your whereabouts, I am committing a breach of a moral principle (one should speak truthfully and sincerely to others and not with deception). If I tell the truth however, then it is likely that the axe-wielding maniac will assert a grave moral breach against your person. Thus it is ethical, but not strictly moral, to lie under these circumstances. The ethic applied depends on the situation.
Now, where do the Sambians fit into all this? When one views their behaviour in terms of moral absolutism, they are self-referentially justifiable. The Sambians justify their behaviour because it is their law. The article doesn't make it explicit whether they believe that it is appropriate for every society to engage in this behaviour, so one could claim that their justification also fits those who are in favour of "moral relativism" on a cultural basis. This is of course, not uncommon, as moral relativism and moral absolutism are actually very similar to each other. Both deny the prospect of moral behaviour being subject to rational validity tests or verification. It "just is", and that's all there is to it. The justifications used aren't real justification at all: "It's is what is written in The Book", "It's what the Elder says we must do", "It's just how we do things" or "I'll get beaten up if I don't do it".
When compared to moral universalism however, the cultural norm of the Sambians has some significant problems. The entire practise is based on a completely false anyway, they threaten violence against the youngsters, who are then sexually exploited. In other words, their universal rights, which they deserve, are not being respected by Sambian legal practise. I can't even get around this by attempting to apply "situational ethics" that is, I know that mythic societies like the Sambians have a completely different way of looking at the world, one that rests not on the rational validity but on narrative unity. Besides, there is more than sufficient evidence that confirms that such societies are capable of, and do, change their mythology when the circumstances arise. Claims that it is only modern societies that are legally and culturally dynmaic is quite a myth in its own right.
Of course, the Sambians aren't the only people in the world who don't respect universal human rights and this is actually hardly the worst instance of such a breach either. But it does illustrate quite strongly the distinction between cultural and legal norms and morals. "Culture" as a structure of symbolic structures will never be a moral justification in itself. Speak whatever language you like with whatever sounds you like, cook food and play music in any style you like, wear whatever clothing you like, develop whatever myths and stories that you like - all of this is fine, but when you start directly and physical affecting other people, you are no longer in the realm of "culture" but rather in the realm of morals.
The term "moral universalism" causes some disquiet among people. Many think that the term implies a set of contextual norms that are to be universally applied as a set of moral justifications. With the application of particular contextual norms in the 20th centuries - especially those related to totalitarian governments (e.g., "Race" as a justification by Nazi Germany and "Class" as a justification by Stalin's Soviet Union) or the more medieval and religious ways of thinking.
Nothing could be further from the truth. These are examples of "moral absolutism", not "universalism", and which can be further differentiated from "moral relativism". If you thinking I'm splitting hairs, please let me elaborate. Moral absolutism refers to a code that refers to specific activities which is socially binding (such as the Book of Leviticus from the Old Testament, or for that matter, most legal codes). "Moral relvatism" refers to the use of individual desire or will as justifications for moral behaviour (such as one finds in Nietzsche or Aleister Crowley's statement "Do as thou will and let that be the whole of the law") or the idea that different cultures have different moral standards each of which is deserving of equal respect.
In contrast, moral universalism refers to refers to a code of universal procedural justifications that originate from the individual and that involve other people. Moral universalism recognizes that individuals are the source of moral behaviour but also that it has a regulative orientation. One cannot, strictly speaking, be good to oneself. So the entirety of the "self-regarding" components of any act are axiomatically excluded from moral universalism. There is simply no means that one can verify the relative morality or immorality of self-regarding components, because they simply don't have any rational moral component. They are expressions of the individual senses and individual variation. It's a little bit like trying to determine whether purely objective facts have any moral component (e.g., "It is good or bad that these ants are red?").
On the other side of the coin, is the regulative orientation. Legal systems too seek regulative control over the lives of people, but they do not necessarily comply with the principles of moral universalism. There are multiple reasons for this. For starters, a legal system is also heavily influenced by notions of efficiency. Therefore it often creates laws on the basis of probabilitistic structures, rather than cause and effect or individual variation. Legal systems are also affected by political realities as well, which includes a whole range of individual and cultural prejudices and norms which apparently means for many that they have a right to tell others what they can and cannot do, regardless of whether it directly affects them or not. Thus, the legality or illegality of an action is not a sufficient moral reason in itself to engage or not to engage in an activity. The law itself (law qua law) is neither "right" nor "wrong", rather it is the content that is, to varying degrees "right" or "wrong".
As indicated previously, moral universalism works on procedural justifications. That is, an act is a moral act when an activity occurs on the basis of informed consensus regardless of the content of the act. But this is actually quite a specific mode of consensus. It requires that the actor not only affirms the request for activity (simple consent) but also has the capacity to understand what is involved (informed consent) and the requestee is not being deceptive about their reasons or intentions. To resolve this, resources can be drawn from development psychology and neurology. To summarise a great deal of literature simply, pre-adolescents and those with certain mental disabilities simply lack the intellectual maturity to engage in post-conventional moral reasoning or engage in formal cognitive operations. By late childhood they are capable of making individual assertions, but these are often confused with conventional norms (the desire to be accepted). Only with the advent of adult mental ability does an individual gain the ability to literally "think for themselves" with moral reasoning and differentiate between what is "right" and "wrong" in a meaningful way from legal and cultural norms.
Finally, there is one other component to moral universalism - and this is where it does actually get a bit slippery in practise - the notion of situational ethics. In this circumstances a moral principle may be breached if one has valid reasons to assume that that maintaining the principle will actually cause a more severe breach of morality. To use a fairly famous example from Immanuel Kant, if you seek refuge in my house and I grant you that refuge what do I say when the axe-wielding maniac comes to the door and asks for you? If I lie about your whereabouts, I am committing a breach of a moral principle (one should speak truthfully and sincerely to others and not with deception). If I tell the truth however, then it is likely that the axe-wielding maniac will assert a grave moral breach against your person. Thus it is ethical, but not strictly moral, to lie under these circumstances. The ethic applied depends on the situation.
Now, where do the Sambians fit into all this? When one views their behaviour in terms of moral absolutism, they are self-referentially justifiable. The Sambians justify their behaviour because it is their law. The article doesn't make it explicit whether they believe that it is appropriate for every society to engage in this behaviour, so one could claim that their justification also fits those who are in favour of "moral relativism" on a cultural basis. This is of course, not uncommon, as moral relativism and moral absolutism are actually very similar to each other. Both deny the prospect of moral behaviour being subject to rational validity tests or verification. It "just is", and that's all there is to it. The justifications used aren't real justification at all: "It's is what is written in The Book", "It's what the Elder says we must do", "It's just how we do things" or "I'll get beaten up if I don't do it".
When compared to moral universalism however, the cultural norm of the Sambians has some significant problems. The entire practise is based on a completely false anyway, they threaten violence against the youngsters, who are then sexually exploited. In other words, their universal rights, which they deserve, are not being respected by Sambian legal practise. I can't even get around this by attempting to apply "situational ethics" that is, I know that mythic societies like the Sambians have a completely different way of looking at the world, one that rests not on the rational validity but on narrative unity. Besides, there is more than sufficient evidence that confirms that such societies are capable of, and do, change their mythology when the circumstances arise. Claims that it is only modern societies that are legally and culturally dynmaic is quite a myth in its own right.
Of course, the Sambians aren't the only people in the world who don't respect universal human rights and this is actually hardly the worst instance of such a breach either. But it does illustrate quite strongly the distinction between cultural and legal norms and morals. "Culture" as a structure of symbolic structures will never be a moral justification in itself. Speak whatever language you like with whatever sounds you like, cook food and play music in any style you like, wear whatever clothing you like, develop whatever myths and stories that you like - all of this is fine, but when you start directly and physical affecting other people, you are no longer in the realm of "culture" but rather in the realm of morals.
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Re:
Date: 2003-06-21 04:54 am (UTC)I have moral convictions which I believe to be universally applicable, but a number of them are not shared by many of my compatriots. What is immoral to me may be quite moral to them - and vice versa. Who is right? and how do we know the answer to that question?
One often hears the claim that it is bad for a child not to have a father, one doesn't usually hear that the father is immoral for having left the children alone with their mother. Children without fathers tend to be seen as the victims of circumstance. This is also true of children whose mothers are dead, or as in your case, whose mothers are themselves victims of societal pressures. But children whose mothers have simply walked out are considered victims of an immoral woman.
Your adoptive mother is known to you. You singled her out for mention as a person who fucked up her life and yours. Your adoptive father is also known or fairly easily knowable. You didn't mention his failure at all.
no subject
Date: 2003-06-21 07:48 pm (UTC)You need to explain to me the difference between a cultural prejudice and a moral conviction.
I thought the above discussion and references would have down that but nonetheless...
A cultural prejudice is a moral claim based on norms with are not rationally grounded. It compares with moral convictions which are universalisable and are based on the consensus of participants - regardless of the act.
...how do we know the answer to that question?
In the same way we know what is objectively true and what is subjectively beautiful, we can ascertain what is intersubjectively moral, regardless of the objective facts or subjective feelings of the particular act. It is grounded in procedure, rather than content. As I mentioned at the start of this thread it is grounded in in is defined as the consensus between the direct participants of an act.
It is also worth pointing out that that is an attempt is not made to rationally ground moral behaviour then morality simply becomes a competition of competing individual and group wills. Politically, that is how a great deal of it is legislated. But that hardly is just.
Your adoptive father is also known or fairly easily knowable. You didn't mention his failure at all.
Well to elaborate on the issue he spent some time working away from home as a nickel miner and, if the correspondence I managed to collect on the matter has some veracity, was told to leave and never return, which he did with some disappointment.