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In the last three days I have written over 12,000 words on cyberpunk literature with author biographies, plot synopses, conventional literary criticism, social typologies using Jameson's methodology, narrative and thematic deconstruction using Derrida and characterization using Butler's (Judith, not Octavia) theory of performativity. And I've written an evaluation of the literature as whole with a combined methodology including the phenomenology of technology, semiotics and psychoanalysis and neofunctional sociology.

Phew! Those four coffees in the morning really did make a difference after a night on the booze.

A sound bite...

"Genuine science fiction, the mythology of modernity, has hardly had sufficient time to develop many literary classics (Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds are two prominent exceptions), yet anyone with a long term view of literary history should realize by now that only science fiction will create new classics in modernity."

Related topic. I did a geek test and scored 63.70809% (Extreme Geek). And I didn't even exaggerate the answers.

Mind you, I did once finish Rubik's cube in under a minute.

A question

Date: 2003-06-11 05:38 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
Define modernity

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-12 04:51 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

Heh, good one.

Evidently you are thoroughly aware of the various debates in the social science about (I almost typed "kona ba", which is Tetum for "about") what is this thing called modernity. The problem isn't helped by all sorts of so-called postmodernists being antithetical towards it without ever describing what it is - or even worse still, only taking up an aesthetic description.

My conception of modernity is derived from that used by Jurgen Habermas in the first Part of Legitimation Crisis, that is, a social scientific definition. This requires pinpointing those core structural features that exist in all societies. These include (a) the means of systematic differentiation and governing institution and (b) the means of production and (c) the means of communication (this last one is my own contribution). Further universal which are derived from these include (d) the mode of consciousness and (e) dominant crises.

The social formations, defined by a correlation between the structures that have a causal relationship to each other (a simultaneous equation if you like), are Primitive (this is not used in the pejorative sense), Traditional and Modern. A modern society is characterized by the introduction of of corporate institutions, differentiation on the basis of economic class, an industrial means of production, print for the means of communication, a secular mode of consciousness and crises derived from the economic system.

One error that I realized a minute after I made the post is of course that sf doesn't provide the only classics (heck Zola is still in print), but I think it will provide the only lasting classics.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-12 10:53 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
Modernity is institutionalised change. The rest is crap, claiming that some particular eddies in the unending flow are 'the' factors of modernity.

Institutionalised change has all sorts of implications, and requires certain institutional underpinnings. But the key element of modernity is change as an expected condition of normal life at levels way above that experienced by any other society.

Societies that can manage unending change prosper, those that can't, don't. Modernity favours democracy, since it is the form of government most comfortable with change (incorporating institutionalised change of government). Modernity favours individualism and reduces the claims of authority to 'we are human' because the solvent of change sweeps away the basis for other claims.

Modernity favours the US since it is the large polity with the most open policy market and therefore most able to ride (and, indeed, generate) change.

The effort to 'capture' modernity in quasi-Marxian outlooks just so misses the point with its attempt to create simplistic causal hierarchies and provide some predictable endpoint. For uncertainty is the companion of unending change. We know more and more yet have less and less ability to see what the future will be like since the possibilities continue to evolve and expand -- there is nothing so dated as a vision of the future.

Now, SF is the archetypal genre of modernity most certainly. But that is because it is *about* imagining change. In the face of expanding knowledge AND expanding uncertainty, the space for imagination grows greater, not less.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-12 11:14 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

Modernity is institutionalised change. The rest is crap, claiming that some particular eddies in the unending flow are 'the' factors of modernity.

Well, we'll disagree there. IMO opinion examples (even widespread and dominant in particular locations) of the modern mode of consciousness existed before the development of the industrial revolution and movable type print.

Furthemore, the historical evidence is that institutional change occurs after the ideas receive popular support as any sort of power elite does its utmost to maintain power. It may be Marx who first pointed out the tension between changes in the forces of production (and reproduction, I will add) and institutional relations, but that doesn't make it wrong you know. Otherwise one is merely being an antithesis of a Marxist who argues (like a Christian) that X is correct because Y said so.

Modernity favours the US since it is the large polity with the most open policy market and therefore most able to ride (and, indeed, generate) change.

Which doesn't really explain its extraordinary low voter turnout.

Modernity will favour whoever put the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity into practise.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-12 11:42 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
Yhe principle that 'any power elite does its utmost to retain power' is clearly false. Recent history is replete with examples of elites who gave up when their resources were not exhausted -- the problem typically being they simply didn't believe in whatever enough to do what was required (or, alternatively, did not realise what was required).

I have no idea what 'a mode of consciousness' is, so it is a bit difficult to discuss same. People have various ways of looking at the world, that I understand.

The USA's low voter turnout is somewhat exaggerated (one should look at proportion of population who votes over given time, not in a particular election). But the US has so many elections, that each individual one is less important. And so many checks and balances that each election is less important too.

But that seems something of a non-sequitir, since openness of policy market has nothing to do with voter turnout (to take extreme case, consider the old USSR).

Also, I said institutionalised change, not institutional change. That occurs too, but it not the key thing: it is more consequence than cause.

Modernity grew up gradually, to be sure. And certainly, one can see the forces that led to the industrial revolution as part of that build up. Not least of which is the scientific revolution. My old teacher David Stove was not wrong when he said of Western civilisation that it was the first civilisation to learn how to learn. (And still going strong -- the only civilisation to produce any important original ideas in the C20th, for example.)

As for tensions between economic structures, structures of power and ideas, writers were pointing that out long before Marx. Such as the C13th Arab proto-sociologist whose name currently escapes me (Ibn Khaludn perhaps?). Marx just made it pretentious and chiliastic, secular Gnostic prophet that he was (with the suitably awful record of prediction -- Tocqueville and Nietzsche both did much better).

I have no problem with causal interaction, still less with finding the logics (plural) underlying events, it is trying to beat that into permanent causal hierarchies I have problems with. For example, I do not regard technology as 'the' driver because technological dynamism is itself dependent on particular institutional structures which are themselves then acted upon.

As for liberty, equalty and fraternity, I notice with interest that Americans are (according to Pew polling) notably less prejudiced than Brits and Europeans. General Eric Shinseki just retired as US Army Chief of Staff. When is there likely to be such a figure in Europe?

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-13 12:54 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com
Recent history is replete with examples of elites ...

Where? The only example I can think of is the military coup in Costa Rica, which then was intelligent enough to abolish itself.

I have no idea what 'a mode of consciousness' is, so it is a bit difficult to discuss same

Compare the narrative unity in the thinking of people in primitive cultures, compared to that of the metaphysical absolutism of traditional societies, compared to the secular rationalism of modern societies.

I said institutionalised change, not institutional change.

Modernity would have never had institutionalised change without the change in institutional powers that allowed such a concept.

Tocqueville and Nietzsche both did much better..

The former I hope so, the latter only because someone tried to put his madness into practise.

I do not regard technology as 'the' driver because technological dynamism is itself dependent on particular institutional structures which are themselves then acted upon.

Not necessarily. Ideas can form independently to the institutional structures (vis-a-vis the distinction between social systems and cultural lifeworlds) - otherwise institutions wouldn't change (in terms of their organizing principles) at all!

I don't think technology is "the" driver, but I do think that change requires both but the relative success of the ideas is contingent upon the advances in communications technology.

To give an on-topic example, there were plenty of proto-Protestant organizations prior to the movable type printing press. Some even became dominant in entire provinces. But with the limited ability to express their ideas to other lands, the Church simply stomped on them. The reformation didn't succeed until after the printing press. I think there's very good reasons for this.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-14 10:29 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
An obvious example of an elite who gave up is the nomenklatura of the old Soviet Empire. In theory, they always had more than enough power to crush revolt. In practice, they just didn't believe any more. In China, that wasn't true, hence the Beijing massacre.

I really dislike the 'mode of consciousness', 'forms of production' etc terminology because it sets up misleading simplistic abstractions which are destructive to clear thought and understanding. (One of more destructive elements is a tendency to reinterpret critical comments in ways which simply aren't meant.)

I have no problem with causal complexity, hence no problem with the key importance of the printing press in the Reformation in precisely the way you describe.

The specific point I was alluding to was is illustrated by how much of the technology that Europe adopted with such amazing effects was invented in China. But Europe had the institutional structures (and also the ideas, but the former was crucial since similar ideas pop up in various advanced cultures) which led to their adoption and development in ways China lacked.

Consider imperialism: Islam has in fact a much greater history of imperialism than Christian Europe -- it spent a 1000 years aggressing against every culture it came up against. It didn't stop because it got guilty about it -- Western civilisation is the ONLY civilisation to ever start to feel guilty about imperialism -- but because it came up against stronger predators. All the Islamists are about is recovering that tradition of cultural aggression (to be sure, in large part because they feel themselves to be under constant cultural assault: but 'let's blow people up' is not the required response to cultural competition).

And Nietszche predicted, in effect, both Leninism AND Nazism -- the will to power and murderous brotherhoods. It is not merely that the Nazis took up a bastardised understanding of his ideas.

Back to those destructive simplicities: thinking 'metaphysical absolutism' covers the Classical world, Christian Europe (Catholic & Orthodox), Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and Shinto civilisation is just false.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-15 01:46 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com
In practice, they just didn't believe any more.

I must confess I was being a little wry as I knew that you would bring up the Soviet Union. We'll have different opinions on this because in my opinion the rulers of the Soviet Union weren't an entrenched elite, in the Gorbachev period. Those days were well and truly over. Also, I would suggest that many took their role as "representatives of the people" with some seriousness. When it was evident that they weren't they took upon themselves to resign.

Or, as someone once rather blithely commented to me. "You aren't a real dictator when you give up power just because a 100,000 people turn up at the Presidential power and blow raspberries at you."

But I suspect we're talking cross-purposes here. At the end of a day an entrenched elite proves itself to be one but not letting go of power when legitimately challenged.

sets up misleading simplistic abstractions which are destructive to clear thought and understanding.

I don't have much of a problem with "simplistic abstractions" per se (after all, E=mc^2 is a simplistic abstraction), but rather my concern with is whether the constituent components of the abstraction are sufficiently grounded.

It didn't stop because it got guilty about it

No, but it started getting very secular and humanist in Spain. Until the fanatics from Leon turned up that is...

... a bastardised understanding of his ideas.

My reading of Nietzsche is that is was no bastardization. And, as you know, I disagree with your assesment of Lenin and I've presented the reasons why in the past. The actual written works make it quite clear - Lenin's conviction was for a political party with "iron-clad" discipline but also for a federation of councils based on partipatory democracy. Keep in mind supported the abolition of the state.

thinking 'metaphysical absolutism' covers the Classical world, Christian Europe (Catholic & Orthodox), Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and Shinto civilisation is just false.

You left out Ancient Egypt, Judea, Babylon, Sumer, and the Incan and Mayan civilizations ;-)

'Metaphysical absolutism', in my very carefully considered opinion conveys the way that people in all those societies thought about the world. It doesn't mean that they're any less or moral in their judgement, it doesn't mean that they are no more or less capable of thinking. It doesn't mean that their content or character isn't diverse.

But it is the defining orientation of their worldview, it is very different to we moderns and had it evident through analysis of their political and legal systems and moral justifications.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-20 10:56 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
(1) A key element in the decline of the Soviet Union was precisely that the elite became *more* entrenched over time. Which means that networks of corruption got worse and worse until it sank the entire system.

This did, of course, also undermine belief. If you are a place-server, your willingness to go and out and kill is probably less than if you are a True Believer.

Gorbachev's problem is that he was a civilised true believer. This is incompatible with Leninism. Once he have up the Leninist project, the Soviet Union had no reason to exist, and evaporated. Belief (at least the overt forms of the same) was crucial to keep the thing going.

I will concede that open display of their lack of popular support was undermining, but previously they simply would not have permitted such display. Permitting the display was a sign of the decay. Didn't make the system less dictatorial, merely increasingly non-functional. The form of dictatorship with increasingly less substance.

(2) e = mc2 is hardly an analogous case. An example of what I mean are definitions of capitalism so crude they cannot differentiate between North America, Latin America and the old Soviet Union. (Of course, clearly have some other purpose than analysis. To whit, to justify a sense of belonging to a moral and intellectual elite and actions to put into effect that sense of self-importance.) Hernando de Soto has a great line -- capitalism is a great idea and Latin America should try it some time.

(3) Nietzsche was not an anti-Semite. Makes it hard to claim that Nazism was simply an implementation of his ideas. Which is not to say that there were not elements in Nietzsche that could be used to bolster the jacobinisation of Aryan racism, clearly there were. But that is what bastardisation entails -- taking some elements out of context.

As to Lenin, given Rosa Luxembourg accurately predicted Brezhnev but Lenin's own performance was much worse, I think hanging your analysis on one or two pamphlets but ignoring the awkward bits of his performance in power (essentially all of it, from the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, to the repression of the Kronstadt uprising, to his constant instructions to kill more people) is just wishful thinking way past the sensible.

(4) Not to mention the fanatics from North Africa. The real tragedy of al-Andalus is how it was caught in the middle between a resurgent Christian Spain and a purist North African Islam which had the military vigour it lacked.

(5) It is hard to argue with and about a term which I have no idea what it means.

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-21 02:06 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

RE 1: As I mentioned I think we're talking cross-purposes here. You'll find no argument from me that Gorbachev was a civilized true believer - a true believer in communism, and social democracy, I may point out as well. This per se isn't incompatiable with Leninism. I have no doubt that Lenin was a true believer as well.

The problem of "Leninism" I think refers to the transfer of his ideas about the party to that of the state.

Re 2: I agree with you entirely on "crude definitions". Definitions can be very general as long as they are precise and not ambigious. As an example I think that capitalism refers to proportional ownership by monetary value. And that's it. I don't think it is necessarily tied to to democracy or to anything else. Once one starts adding other beneficial criteria and excluding distateful one's then the strict definition becomes ideologically ambigious.

I have arguments with members of the International Socialist Organization who claim that the Soviet Union wasn't socialist because it didn't have a workplace method of participatory democracy. They are invariably unhappy when I refer them to The Manifesto of the Communist Party which acknowledges several versions of socialism, many of which don't even have an inkling of democracy.

Re 3: A think a reading of The Geneaology of Morals indicates his racism.

As for Luxembourg vis-a-vis Lenin, you won't get any argument from me on that one. I like Luxembourg's analysis, I just think it was profoundly inappropriate for a political party that was illegal and underground.

Re 4: Yes. They certainly didn't help either.

Re 5: Let's start with Claude Levi-Strauss' The Raw and The Cooked. Are you familiar with that?

Re: A question

Date: 2003-06-21 11:39 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] erudito.livejournal.com
(1) What Lenin did was thinly update Robespierre. The dynamics are essentially the same.

(a) Here is my wonderful good intentions, a vision that profoundly trumps any previous version of the good.
(b) So profoundly is that so that any objection or dissent about this project is completely illegitimate, and a sign of profound wickedness
(c) So profoundly, that any level of concentration of power necessary for its implementation is fine.

The patterns of Leninism, replicating those of Jacobinism, therefore follow (except Lenin learnt from Robespierre's downfall and never permitted any deliberative institution he didn't control). The only difference between Stalin and Lenin is that Stalin applied to Bolsheviks the forms of politics that Lenin applied to everyone else. (Which is, of course, essentially what Khruschev accused Stalin of in the 'Secret Speech'.)

Of course, the 'progressive' intelligentsia loves talking about intentions because, being not responsible for anything, their intentions are clearly more pure than anyone else's. Hence all sorts of dynamics of 'analysis' such as, rightwingers do wicked things because they're rightwingers, leftwingers do wicked things because rightwingers make them do so. Left to themselves, their pure intentions would have been fine.

Obviously, I don't buy this for a second. Yes, of course Lenin was a true believer, that's precisely the problem -- what he was a true believer in and what he believed that warranted.

(2) My working definition of capitalism is quite similar to yours: a system where the creation and transfer of capital assets is dominated by market exchanges. I am not entirely happy with it because I don't think it captures sufficiently explicitly the situation where state regulation of market exchange is so heavy as to massively atrophy it -- the problem in Latin America (Hernando de Soto's famous experiment of it taking 289 days of dealing with bureaucracy to legally open a small garment business in Lima.)

(3) Reading the link, I was too generous to Nietzsche; it is clearly too long since I have read him. I note with interest that the author of the piece has come to similar conclusions about Hitler (and other matters) as I had.

(5) Claude Levi-Strauss has not been part of my reading, so no I am not familiar.






No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-12 01:12 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] cvisors.livejournal.com
At least I am an extreme geek :)

I think it must be my collection of obsolete computers.

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-12 04:55 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

Well, I'm a little bit more aged than you and some of the questions are time relevant. So that's not surprising really. I'm sure at your age I would have scored well below 59%.

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-12 11:55 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] cvisors.livejournal.com
heh! True, but remember I am only 29 ;)

Benjamin

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-12 11:16 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

I think it must be my collection of obsolete computers.

You've probably already considered this but...

<a href="http://www.beowulf.org/>Beowulf!</a>

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-13 12:02 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] cvisors.livejournal.com
The issue is that other than two of my machines:
The SGI Indigo2 and the O2. Run the same operating system.

Though I am working on clustering my two VMS boxes, one alpha and one VAX.

yup I am a geek :)

Benjamin

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-14 01:08 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] jadine.livejournal.com
There is a limit on how useful Beowulf clusters are at home, however.

I built one for a project at one point, but I currently find my obsolete computers to be more useful as furniture than most anything else.

Incidentally, I rated Extreme Geek, but not even a full 59%. I've got a few years' disadvantage, though :)

Re: No Fair I only scored 59.96055%

Date: 2003-06-14 04:41 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] tcpip.livejournal.com

Regardless being a few percentage points behin, I still consider people like yourself and cvisors to be the torchbearers of this technical revolution.

We have a world to connect.

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