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tcpipIn the course of my daily life, I engage in a wide range of often quite difficult technical tasks. This of course necessitates a great deal of research. But my interests are not truncuated, even though this is demanding on my time. There is also research that I do "for fun". Although this research has a formal, institutionalized agenda, it is not directly related to my work.
Part of this research has to do with developing a logical system about thoughts and actions. It's derived from an interest in the basis of consciousness (which I guess everyone has) and a disappointment in people who confuse opinion with fact, feelings with thoughts and basically end up making very muddled, unverified assertions yet still cling to them like shit to a sheep's arse. There is, of course, nothing wrong with being ignorant or inexperienced. After all, none of us have perfect knowledge or have experienced everything. But it is terribly sad when a person has a pathological motivation and becomes incapable of reflection and improvement.
Anyway, seeming that I've just spent a few days working on what is the final draft of about almost ten years work on this, it is worthwhile jotting down where all this has come to - and of course, with the invitation of reponses from dear reader of this journal.
My first consideration is "what is consciousness"? There has been traditionally two answers for this. Consciousness has objective origin formed by neurological responses to stimulu. The other is that consciousness has a subjective origin and that the mind has a freedom to direct the body and the imagination to create. Both these arguments have some verification. Obviously thoughts draw upon the objective world and mental states can be seriously affected by psychiatric drugs. Yet it is equally obvious is that that these objective facts do not transcend free will. A person can tell their body, for example, to "lift up my left arm" - and the body (assuming you have a left arm) responds.
Morever, both approaches collapse entirely when confronted with moral problems, whether something is right or wrong. There is no objective way of detemining whether something is right or wrong (there is a rational way, but we'll get to that later). Murder for example, might be a fact, but the fact of murder can't tell us anything about the rightness or wrongness of the murder. Likewise there is no subjective approach to it either as it all it does is engage in self-referential claims, ie., a bunch of assertions with no means of resolution.
It would seem at this point that giving some sort of grounding to consciousness is impossible and that moral problems are basically little more than a shouting match and a competition between forces of will. Fortunately there is actually a way out of all this. It is about creating a new world, distinct from the objective and the subjective, and that new world is called the intersubjective.
With regards to the problem of consciousness, the intersubjective world resolves this through the formation of language. Language consists of signs that signify to a signified. For example, the sign "tree" is a sign in the English language that signifies a particular form of plant-life. The tree itself (or trees in general) are the signified. However, the generation of signs cannot be reduced to either objective or subjective origins. There is no objective language - looking at a tree doesn't transfer the word 'tree' into your head (otherwise there would only be only one static language for the entire species, and that would be Ancient Greek). Nor is the origin subjective. The word 'tree' hasn't simply appeared in your brain out of nowhere and it's useage in the English language isn't due to your force of will. Rather, signs are generated by the agreement between people of what that sign will be used for. The same applies to moral problems. The reason that murder is considered 'wrong' is not due the objective fact of the murder, or even because a particular person says that murder is wrong, but rather because it is a breach of intersubjective relations.
All very well so far. But clearly not all statements are equal. A statement, being a set of signs, also requires some further justification and elaboration. To elaborate, any statement consists of what is being said ("The bar closes in five minutes") or the locutinary aspect, what is being done by the statement (in this case a promise - or maybe even a threat!) or and what is being done with the statement ("Please finish your drinks") or the illocutionary aspect. Further, a statement also assumes that there is intentionalist semantics (i.e., you're actually communicating a state of affairs), that there are formal semantics (i.e, the sentence has a logical structure and is comprehensible - so even if you don't speak the French language the question "Qu'est-ce c'est?" will still mean something to a French speaker). In other words, the generation of statements isn't about putting together random signs.
In moving on to justification, we are moving on from the question of semantics to the question of pragmatics. Thus we are now dealing with speech-acts, rather than speech. Statements. through speech-acts make assertions of validity regarding world relations. So what sort of speech acts are there. Well, for illustrative purposes I'll include their proper nouns. A "constantive" makes a claim of truthfulness to "the" objective world. It deal matters of fact. A "regultative" makes a claim of rightness to "our" intersubjective world. Finally, an "expressive" makes a claim of sincerity to "my" (or "your") subjective world. In every speech-act all three validity claims are raised. Consider the assertion of one person to another: "I'll love you always". This claim can be tested according to whether the speaker is being sincere, whether it is right that they love the other person, and whether - after the test of time - the statement actually is an empirical fact.
This is not quite the end of the story however. It is also quite possible to take these speech-acts across the basic world relations. For example, one can make a constative claim in the social world. "Does the United States exist?", which of course can be answered in the affirmative. "Did Napolean defeat Wellington at the battle of Hastings in 1066?", well no, neither Napolean or Wellingto were at the battle of Hastings (I assume here that we're talking about the same Napolean and the same Wellington - there very well may have been two persons locked in battle in Hastings, 1066 called Napolean and Wellingon!). One can also make expressive statements to the objective world for example - for example, a work of art.
What arises is that speech-acts and world relations form a complex with two dimensions. By elaborating this complex, we discover there are some speech-acts that are rationalisable (i.e., you can work out whether particular examples satisfy the validity claims) and those that are irrationalisable (i.e, we can argue all day about them and never reach an agreement). So, in brief!
Constantive/Objective: Assertions of truth concerning the objective world. A rational complex that represents the knowledge of science and the practise in technology.
Constantive/Intersubjective: An assertion of truth concerning the intesubjective world. A rational complex that represents the knowledge of institutions and their systems (such as politics and economics) and the practise of bureaucratic administration.
Constantive/Subjective: An assertion of truth concerning the subjective state of mind. Irrational because only the subject can ultimately determine this - and that will be a case of internal honesty and feelings, not statements of fact.
Regulative/Objective: An assertion of rightness on the objective world. Irrationalisable as there way of determining whether an object or nature itself is 'good' or 'bad'.
Regulative/Intersubjective: An assertion of rightness in the intersubjective world. Emodied as knowledge in legal code and the legislative, judiciary and executive applications.
Regulative/Subjective: An assertion of rightness in the individual world. Rational as the knowledge of moral principles and the practise of situational ethics.
Expressive/Objective: An assertion of sincerity to the objective world. Rational as the knowledge of aesthetics and the practise of art.
Expressive/Intersubjective: An expression of sincerity in the intersubjective world. Irrationalisable as we will can determine whether a particular culture as a whole is sincere.
Expressive/Subjective: An expression of sincerity to the subjective world. Rationalisable in terms of the their tastes and desires - eroticism - and in the practise of sensuality. (No, this is not being pervy, it's being honest. It includes food and drink, roller coaster rides, athlectics and recreational drugs. Your body tells you whether it's enjoyable or not).
Well, I hope that wasn't too exhausting. One of the advantages of having this system is that it means you can pretty quickly with the irrationalisable complexes, or at least have a amused orientation to them. You can neatly step away from a debate between a witch and a mullah over whether life on earth originated from the menstrual blood of the Moon Goddess or whether it was the unspoken will of Allah. Sure, the debate may be interesting from a cultural perspective and one can see how one side of the other scores technical points on consistency and illustration, but ultimately it will never be worth getting hot under the collar over _unless_ one is irrational.
Rational complexes are another matter entirely. The point that must be emphasized here is that they are _in principle_ rationalizable. None of them are perfect and all are in a state of flux, development, connection, fragmentation and distortion. Law is a good example. Sure, the law exists as a set of regulations in the intersubjective world, we know that. But how developed do you think it is with regards to the rightness and wrongness? How just and fair is it for example that in some states two people can climb into the sack and engage in full-body massages but _only_ if they're male and female? And how is the principle of regulative rightness and wrongness distorted by the institutional powers?
Rational complexes are useful because they inspire people towards engaging in what are, ultimately, thoroughly sane forms of motivation and action, such as interest in truth (rational constantives), an interest in justice (rational regulatives) and interest in beauty (rational expressives). Of course, not everybody has such motivations. As mentioned from the outset, all this assumes that people are engaging in intentionalist semantics - i.e., that they are communicating with the interest of reaching understanding. Many people are interested in treating others as some sort of strategic opponent and will use any number of deceptions to ensure their "victory".
I could elaborate more on how such people think and the specifics of their psychopathologies but that will have to wait for another day. A few simple characteristics are illustrative however:
- They will make assertions as if they were already verified
- They will make assertions of particular instances and expand them to a general nature
- They will use institutional definitions rather than common-language definitions if it suits the purposes
- They will not differentiate between prejudiced opinions and considered convictions
- They will reject that any of the above is true, regardless of the evidence!
On a practical note - and I suppose what this is all about being a livejournal post and all - such people simply aren't worth dealing with. It is terribly sad that they do think this way, that somewhere along the line their thinking faculties have turned to mush and their sense of self is in perpetual crisis (I note that such people have unjustified high opinions of themselves and a prone to ascribing themselves with special divine qualities). Indeed, I must confess I have in the past thoroughly enjoyed the acts of pulling the so-called arguments of such people apart with the sort of glee that can only be inspired by a logician. I've also noticed that if you confront them with the inadequacies of their own thinking and they simply become more fervent in their pathology. Some of the "debates" have been the best entertainment ever.
But I'm not a psychotherapist. I don't have the skills or training to deal with such people.
And so, from now on, I don't.
(And that's the moral of the story)
Part of this research has to do with developing a logical system about thoughts and actions. It's derived from an interest in the basis of consciousness (which I guess everyone has) and a disappointment in people who confuse opinion with fact, feelings with thoughts and basically end up making very muddled, unverified assertions yet still cling to them like shit to a sheep's arse. There is, of course, nothing wrong with being ignorant or inexperienced. After all, none of us have perfect knowledge or have experienced everything. But it is terribly sad when a person has a pathological motivation and becomes incapable of reflection and improvement.
Anyway, seeming that I've just spent a few days working on what is the final draft of about almost ten years work on this, it is worthwhile jotting down where all this has come to - and of course, with the invitation of reponses from dear reader of this journal.
My first consideration is "what is consciousness"? There has been traditionally two answers for this. Consciousness has objective origin formed by neurological responses to stimulu. The other is that consciousness has a subjective origin and that the mind has a freedom to direct the body and the imagination to create. Both these arguments have some verification. Obviously thoughts draw upon the objective world and mental states can be seriously affected by psychiatric drugs. Yet it is equally obvious is that that these objective facts do not transcend free will. A person can tell their body, for example, to "lift up my left arm" - and the body (assuming you have a left arm) responds.
Morever, both approaches collapse entirely when confronted with moral problems, whether something is right or wrong. There is no objective way of detemining whether something is right or wrong (there is a rational way, but we'll get to that later). Murder for example, might be a fact, but the fact of murder can't tell us anything about the rightness or wrongness of the murder. Likewise there is no subjective approach to it either as it all it does is engage in self-referential claims, ie., a bunch of assertions with no means of resolution.
It would seem at this point that giving some sort of grounding to consciousness is impossible and that moral problems are basically little more than a shouting match and a competition between forces of will. Fortunately there is actually a way out of all this. It is about creating a new world, distinct from the objective and the subjective, and that new world is called the intersubjective.
With regards to the problem of consciousness, the intersubjective world resolves this through the formation of language. Language consists of signs that signify to a signified. For example, the sign "tree" is a sign in the English language that signifies a particular form of plant-life. The tree itself (or trees in general) are the signified. However, the generation of signs cannot be reduced to either objective or subjective origins. There is no objective language - looking at a tree doesn't transfer the word 'tree' into your head (otherwise there would only be only one static language for the entire species, and that would be Ancient Greek). Nor is the origin subjective. The word 'tree' hasn't simply appeared in your brain out of nowhere and it's useage in the English language isn't due to your force of will. Rather, signs are generated by the agreement between people of what that sign will be used for. The same applies to moral problems. The reason that murder is considered 'wrong' is not due the objective fact of the murder, or even because a particular person says that murder is wrong, but rather because it is a breach of intersubjective relations.
All very well so far. But clearly not all statements are equal. A statement, being a set of signs, also requires some further justification and elaboration. To elaborate, any statement consists of what is being said ("The bar closes in five minutes") or the locutinary aspect, what is being done by the statement (in this case a promise - or maybe even a threat!) or and what is being done with the statement ("Please finish your drinks") or the illocutionary aspect. Further, a statement also assumes that there is intentionalist semantics (i.e., you're actually communicating a state of affairs), that there are formal semantics (i.e, the sentence has a logical structure and is comprehensible - so even if you don't speak the French language the question "Qu'est-ce c'est?" will still mean something to a French speaker). In other words, the generation of statements isn't about putting together random signs.
In moving on to justification, we are moving on from the question of semantics to the question of pragmatics. Thus we are now dealing with speech-acts, rather than speech. Statements. through speech-acts make assertions of validity regarding world relations. So what sort of speech acts are there. Well, for illustrative purposes I'll include their proper nouns. A "constantive" makes a claim of truthfulness to "the" objective world. It deal matters of fact. A "regultative" makes a claim of rightness to "our" intersubjective world. Finally, an "expressive" makes a claim of sincerity to "my" (or "your") subjective world. In every speech-act all three validity claims are raised. Consider the assertion of one person to another: "I'll love you always". This claim can be tested according to whether the speaker is being sincere, whether it is right that they love the other person, and whether - after the test of time - the statement actually is an empirical fact.
This is not quite the end of the story however. It is also quite possible to take these speech-acts across the basic world relations. For example, one can make a constative claim in the social world. "Does the United States exist?", which of course can be answered in the affirmative. "Did Napolean defeat Wellington at the battle of Hastings in 1066?", well no, neither Napolean or Wellingto were at the battle of Hastings (I assume here that we're talking about the same Napolean and the same Wellington - there very well may have been two persons locked in battle in Hastings, 1066 called Napolean and Wellingon!). One can also make expressive statements to the objective world for example - for example, a work of art.
What arises is that speech-acts and world relations form a complex with two dimensions. By elaborating this complex, we discover there are some speech-acts that are rationalisable (i.e., you can work out whether particular examples satisfy the validity claims) and those that are irrationalisable (i.e, we can argue all day about them and never reach an agreement). So, in brief!
Constantive/Objective: Assertions of truth concerning the objective world. A rational complex that represents the knowledge of science and the practise in technology.
Constantive/Intersubjective: An assertion of truth concerning the intesubjective world. A rational complex that represents the knowledge of institutions and their systems (such as politics and economics) and the practise of bureaucratic administration.
Constantive/Subjective: An assertion of truth concerning the subjective state of mind. Irrational because only the subject can ultimately determine this - and that will be a case of internal honesty and feelings, not statements of fact.
Regulative/Objective: An assertion of rightness on the objective world. Irrationalisable as there way of determining whether an object or nature itself is 'good' or 'bad'.
Regulative/Intersubjective: An assertion of rightness in the intersubjective world. Emodied as knowledge in legal code and the legislative, judiciary and executive applications.
Regulative/Subjective: An assertion of rightness in the individual world. Rational as the knowledge of moral principles and the practise of situational ethics.
Expressive/Objective: An assertion of sincerity to the objective world. Rational as the knowledge of aesthetics and the practise of art.
Expressive/Intersubjective: An expression of sincerity in the intersubjective world. Irrationalisable as we will can determine whether a particular culture as a whole is sincere.
Expressive/Subjective: An expression of sincerity to the subjective world. Rationalisable in terms of the their tastes and desires - eroticism - and in the practise of sensuality. (No, this is not being pervy, it's being honest. It includes food and drink, roller coaster rides, athlectics and recreational drugs. Your body tells you whether it's enjoyable or not).
Well, I hope that wasn't too exhausting. One of the advantages of having this system is that it means you can pretty quickly with the irrationalisable complexes, or at least have a amused orientation to them. You can neatly step away from a debate between a witch and a mullah over whether life on earth originated from the menstrual blood of the Moon Goddess or whether it was the unspoken will of Allah. Sure, the debate may be interesting from a cultural perspective and one can see how one side of the other scores technical points on consistency and illustration, but ultimately it will never be worth getting hot under the collar over _unless_ one is irrational.
Rational complexes are another matter entirely. The point that must be emphasized here is that they are _in principle_ rationalizable. None of them are perfect and all are in a state of flux, development, connection, fragmentation and distortion. Law is a good example. Sure, the law exists as a set of regulations in the intersubjective world, we know that. But how developed do you think it is with regards to the rightness and wrongness? How just and fair is it for example that in some states two people can climb into the sack and engage in full-body massages but _only_ if they're male and female? And how is the principle of regulative rightness and wrongness distorted by the institutional powers?
Rational complexes are useful because they inspire people towards engaging in what are, ultimately, thoroughly sane forms of motivation and action, such as interest in truth (rational constantives), an interest in justice (rational regulatives) and interest in beauty (rational expressives). Of course, not everybody has such motivations. As mentioned from the outset, all this assumes that people are engaging in intentionalist semantics - i.e., that they are communicating with the interest of reaching understanding. Many people are interested in treating others as some sort of strategic opponent and will use any number of deceptions to ensure their "victory".
I could elaborate more on how such people think and the specifics of their psychopathologies but that will have to wait for another day. A few simple characteristics are illustrative however:
- They will make assertions as if they were already verified
- They will make assertions of particular instances and expand them to a general nature
- They will use institutional definitions rather than common-language definitions if it suits the purposes
- They will not differentiate between prejudiced opinions and considered convictions
- They will reject that any of the above is true, regardless of the evidence!
On a practical note - and I suppose what this is all about being a livejournal post and all - such people simply aren't worth dealing with. It is terribly sad that they do think this way, that somewhere along the line their thinking faculties have turned to mush and their sense of self is in perpetual crisis (I note that such people have unjustified high opinions of themselves and a prone to ascribing themselves with special divine qualities). Indeed, I must confess I have in the past thoroughly enjoyed the acts of pulling the so-called arguments of such people apart with the sort of glee that can only be inspired by a logician. I've also noticed that if you confront them with the inadequacies of their own thinking and they simply become more fervent in their pathology. Some of the "debates" have been the best entertainment ever.
But I'm not a psychotherapist. I don't have the skills or training to deal with such people.
And so, from now on, I don't.
(And that's the moral of the story)
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Minor Semantic Quibbles
Date: 2003-03-15 05:34 am (UTC)Also in, the following paragraph
Morever, both approaches collapse entirely when confronted with moral problems, whether something is right or wrong. There is no objective way of detemining whether something is right or wrong (there is a rational way, but we'll get to that later). Murder for example, might be a fact, but the fact of murder can't tell us anything about the rightness or wrongness of the murder. Likewise there is no subjective approach to it either as it all it does is engage in self-referential claims, ie., a bunch of assertions with no means of resolution.
The use of the word "murder" pre-supposes a moral judgement, because murder is the name of a crime. While there is no value-free word for the act, "killing" comes closer, at least according to my dictionary. And that is the point you're after, right?
And because I haven't said so yet, welcome to LiveJournal, and thanks for the thought provoking post. Keep up the good work.
Re: Minor Semantic Quibbles
Date: 2003-03-15 05:49 pm (UTC)Correct you are in all accounts! "Represents" is of course, not the right word... although "represented by" might be. And of course, you're right about murder as well, but if I just used the phrase "killing", well that could include manslaughter, accidental death and stuff like that. I'm not suggesting that the legal phrase "murder" is being determined a priori, rather just to give the impression of the calculated, planned and violent killing of another human being against their will (I want to leave volunteer soldiers and duellists out of this!) ...
And thanks for the welcome, much appreciated... I have an inkling that my next post is going to be on Hannah Arendt and political involvement ;-)
no subject
Date: 2003-03-15 07:38 pm (UTC)"Represent", as a verb, seems to imply that this is the sole example. If this is the case, then no problem. If not, perhaps describing the cases as "representative" or "a representative" to imply the existence of other, unspecified examples.
And of course, you're right about murder as well, but if I just used the phrase "killing", well that could include manslaughter, accidental death and stuff like that. I'm not suggesting that the legal phrase "murder" is being determined a priori, rather just to give the impression of the calculated, planned and violent killing of another human being against their will (I want to leave volunteer soldiers and duellists out of this!)
Hmmm, tough one. Defined that way, murder is an objetive term, but most people will interpret it subjectively. Perhaps a footnote providing your explanation would be useful?
no subject
Date: 2003-03-15 08:10 pm (UTC)*hug*
no subject
Date: 2003-03-15 11:15 pm (UTC)You wait for the next post (it'll be shorter promise!)... I"ve been reading Hannah Arendt. Now there's someone who can get my heart moving...